Moral economy : why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens Samuel Bowles.
Material type: TextSeries: The castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economicsPublication details: New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.Description: xvi, 272 pages : illustrations ; 22 cmISBN:- 9780300230512 (Paperback: alk. paper)
- 0300163800
- Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
- 303.35 B68M 23
- HB72 .B683 2016
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Notes | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | Central Library, IISER Bhopal Reference Section | Reference | 303.35 B68M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan | Reserve | 10785 |
Browsing Central Library, IISER Bhopal shelves, Shelving location: Reference Section, Collection: Reference Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
No cover image available | ||||||||
302.5 Y3N Narratives of disenchantment and secularization : | 302.545 R225M Man in isolation & confinement | 303.3 H113S Structural transformation of the public sphere : | 303.35 B68M Moral economy : | 303.36 D23R Rules : | 303.484 As2C Counterpublics and the state | 303.66 K13T Toward perpetual peace and other writings on politics, peace, and history |
Parts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-266) and index.
The problem with homo economicus -- A constitution for knaves -- Moral sentiments and material interests -- Incentives as information -- A liberal civic culture -- The legislator's dilemma -- A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
There are no comments on this title.