Models in Microeconomic Theory Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.
Publication details: Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2020.Edition: Version: 2020.12.21 (s)Description: xv, 341 pISBN:- 9781783749201 (Pbk)
- 23 338.5 Os15M
- HB172
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Central Library, IISER Bhopal General Section | 338.5 Os15M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 12270 | ||||
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Central Library, IISER Bhopal General Section | 338.5 Os15M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 12273 | ||||
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Central Library, IISER Bhopal General Section | 338.5 Os15M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 12271 | ||||
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Central Library, IISER Bhopal General Section | 338.5 Os15M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 12272 | ||||
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Central Library, IISER Bhopal On Display | Reference | 338.5 Os15M (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan | Title recommended by Dr Koshal Kishore | 12269 |
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338.5 M314P7 Principles of microeconomics | 338.5 Os15M Models in Microeconomic Theory | 338.5 Os15M Models in Microeconomic Theory | 338.5 Os15M Models in Microeconomic Theory | 338.5 Os15M Models in Microeconomic Theory | 338.5 P652M7 Microeconomics | 338.5 R825L2 Lecture notes in microeconomic theory : the economic agent / |
This book is available in two versions, one that uses feminine pronouns and one that uses masculine pronouns. This version uses feminine pronouns.
Intro -- Personal note -- Preface -- Part I Individual behavior -- 1 Preferences and utility -- 1.1 Preferences -- 1.2 Preference formation -- 1.3 An experiment -- 1.4 Utility functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 2 Choice -- 2.1 Choice and rational choice -- 2.2 Rationalizing choice -- 2.3 Property alpha -- 2.4 Satisficing -- 2.5 The money pump argument -- 2.6 Evidence of choices inconsistent with rationality -- Problems -- Notes -- 3 Preferences under uncertainty -- 3.1 Lotteries -- 3.2 Preferences over lotteries -- 3.3 Expected utility -- 3.4 Theory and experiments -- 3.5 Risk aversion
Problems -- Notes -- 4 Consumer preferences -- 4.1 Bundles of goods -- 4.2 Preferences over bundles -- 4.3 Monotonicity -- 4.4 Continuity -- 4.5 Convexity -- 4.6 Differentiability -- Problems -- Notes -- 5 Consumer behavior -- 5.1 Budget sets -- 5.2 Demand functions -- 5.3 Rational consumer -- 5.4 Differentiable preferences -- 5.5 Rationalizing a demand function -- 5.6 Properties of demand functions -- Problems -- Notes -- 6 Producer behavior -- 6.1 The producer -- 6.2 Output maximization -- 6.3 Profit maximization -- 6.4 Cost function -- 6.5 Producers' preferences -- Problems -- Notes
7 Monopoly -- 7.1 Basic model -- 7.2 Uniform-price monopolistic market -- 7.3 Discriminatory monopoly -- 7.4 Implicit discrimination -- Problems -- Notes -- Part II Equilibrium -- 8 A jungle -- 8.1 Model -- 8.2 Equilibrium -- 8.3 Pareto stability -- 8.4 Equilibrium and Pareto stability in a jungle -- 8.5 Which allocations can be obtained by a social planner who controls the power relation? -- 8.6 Externalities -- Problems -- Notes -- 9 A market -- 9.1 Model -- 9.2 Existence and construction of a market equilibrium -- 9.3 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 9.4 Uniqueness of market equilibrium
Problems -- Notes -- 10 An exchange economy -- 10.1 Model -- 10.2 Competitive equilibrium -- 10.3 Existence of a competitive equilibrium -- 10.4 Reopening trade -- 10.5 Equilibrium and Pareto stability -- 10.6 The core -- 10.7 Competitive equilibrium based on demand functions -- 10.8 Manipulability -- 10.9 Edgeworth box -- Problems -- Notes -- 11 Variants of an exchange economy -- 11.1 Market with indivisible good and money -- 11.2 Exchange economy with uncertainty -- Problems -- Notes -- 12 A market with consumers and producers -- 12.1 Production economy -- 12.2 An economy with capital and labor
Problems -- 13 Equilibrium with prices and expectations -- 13.1 Distributing customers among bank branches -- 13.2 Asymmetric information and adverse selection -- 13.3 A fishing economy -- Problems -- Notes -- 14 A market with asymmetric information -- 14.1 Introductory model -- 14.2 Labor market with education -- Problems -- Notes -- Part III Game theory -- 15 Strategic games -- 15.1 Strategic games and Nash equilibrium -- 15.2 Basic examples -- 15.3 Economic examples -- 15.4 Existence of Nash equilibrium -- 15.5 Strictly competitive games -- 15.6 Kantian equilibrium -- 15.7 Mixed strategies -- 15.8 Interpreting Nash equilibrium.
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